Thomas Wolf & Amanda Grady on Boundaries You Can't Persuade
A GTC Berlin panel where ServiceNow's Amanda Grady and Hugging Face's Thomas Wolf argue that agent security can't live inside the model: it needs firm boundaries, just-in-time identity, and hardware enforcement around it, kept open so no defender is trapped behind someone else's guardrail.
Persuade a Model, Not a Boundary
<strong>Models can be persuaded; firm boundaries cannot</strong> — so real agent security has to live in a control outside the model, not just in the guardrails trained into it.
We all, in the security industry, really firmly believe that we cannot rely solely on LLM-based controls, because ultimately, models can be persuaded, but firm boundaries cannot.
The Guardrail That Would Not Fight Back
When a swarm of 700 agents attacked, the <strong>closed model refused to analyze its own attack logs</strong> — so the only way to run forensics and defend was to switch to open models.
I mean, the model keeps bumping this safety guardrail, saying, okay, these logs that you ask us to analyze, these are the logs of a cyberattack. We're not allowed to work on that.
Identity Borrowed From Humans Won't Fit
Human identity is static and slowly accrued; <strong>agent identity has to be ephemeral and just-in-time</strong>, carrying enough business context to decide, in the moment, what the agent may touch.
So, as a human, we join a company. We typically acquire some access. As time goes on, we acquire more access, but it's relatively static. AI agents are very ephemeral, and, you know, we need just-in-time access to determine what they should be allowed to do.
A Passport the Hardware Checks
ServiceNow's AI Control Tower issues an attested <strong>AI Passport that NVIDIA Sentry enforces at the hardware layer, off the agent's host</strong>, in milliseconds — so a rogue agent is contained, not just switched off.
So you can revoke access, and you can also set contextual tool constraints so that, you know, maybe certain actions are blocked, but certain other business actions can proceed.
Security Unlocks the Other 80%
Thomas Wolf argues we use only about <strong>20% of what agents can already do</strong> — the rest stays locked until the access, context, and boundaries exist to deploy them safely at scale.
There is a case to be made that actually we only right now use, I would say, 20% of what we can do with these agents. It's really the beginning.
Obscurity Is Already Dying
As models get good at reverse-engineering low-level code, <strong>hiding your system stops being protection</strong> — so you may as well open it and defend with boundaries you can actually inspect.
And so you might as well embrace the open there and say, you know, we can't really hide this anyway, because these models are now able to poke in these black box things so well
The Real Risk Is Who Holds the Power
Both guests land on the same worry: <strong>concentration of AI in a few teams</strong> — so the goal is to move from ~18 million people who build AI toward the 100-200 million who build software.
Can we make it so that you're not this passive consumer of this technology built by two companies, but you actually participate?